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LONELINESS AND BELONGING : IS STOIC COSMOPOLITANISM
STILL DEFENSIBLE ?1
ABSTRACT. In view of recent articles citing the Stoics as a defence or refutation
of cosmopolitanism it is legitimate to ask whether the Stoics did in fact have an
argument for cosmopolitanism which may be useful to contemporary political phi-
losophers. I begin by discussing an interpretation of Stoic views on cosmopolitanism
by Martha Nussbaum and A.A. Long and show that the arguments they attribute to
the Stoics are not tenable in the light of present day philosophy. I then argue that the
Stoics did offer a very different argument for cosmopolitanism which is both more
interesting and more plausible in that it draws on a conception of human nature
similar to Aristotle’s and contemporary virtue ethics. Lastly I consider an objection
made to their particular brand of cosmopolitanism by Martha Nussbaum, namely
that a Stoic cosmopolitan life is devoid of personal affiliation and therefore
unbearably lonely. I argue that this objection is in fact unfounded.
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INTRODUCTION
The Stoics have been much cited recently in articles defending or
discussing cosmopolitanism.2 That this is the case should come as no
surprise, as the name and the concept of cosmopolitanism have come
1 I would like to thank William Wringe, Annick Jaulin, the members of the Bilkent
Seminar Group and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments.
2Nussbaum,ForLove ofCountry,Debating theLimits ofPatriotism (Boston:Beacon
Press, 1996); Nussbaum, ‘Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism’, Journal of Political
Philosophy 5 (1997), 1–25; Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity (Cambridge Mass: Har-
vard University Press, 1997); Nussbaum, ‘Duties of Justice, Duties of Material Aid:
Cicero’s Problematic Legacy’, Journal of Political Philosophy 8 (2000), 176–206;
Nussbaum, ‘Compassion and Terror’ Daedalus (Winter, 2003), 10–26; L. Hill, ‘The
Two Republicae of the Roman Stoics: Can a Cosmopolite be a Patriot?’, Citizenship
Studies 4 (2000), 65–79; A. Pagden, ‘Stoicism, Cosmopolitanism, and the Legacy of
European Imperialism’, Constellations 7 (2000), 3–22; and T. Pangle, ‘Socratic Cos-
mopolitanism: Cicero’s Critique and Transformation of the Stoic Ideal’, Canadian
Journal of Political Science/Revue Canadienne de Science Politique 31 (1998), 235–62.
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to us from the Stoics. However, with the exception of one article by
Martha Nussbaum on Cicero,3 it seems the Stoics’ arguments for
cosmopolitanism have not been studied in much detail, a lacuna
which makes a certain amount of sense if the point of quoting the
Stoics is mostly to lend one’s arguments a veneer of respectability by
linking them to something old. If, on the other hand (as is certainly
the case with Nussbaum) we believe that our own arguments benefit
from studying ancient arguments, then it is worth studying these in
some depth. My aim in this paper is to find out whether this attempt
at philosophical recuperation is legitimate, that is, whether any of the
arguments put forward by Stoic philosophers may be judged useful to
contemporary philosophers interested in defending cosmopolitanism.
I do not intend this paper to be a survey of Stoic politics. Of
course, there is no such thing as ‘the Stoic view’ on any given
problem. Stoic views differ in the early, middle and late periods, as
they do from individual to individual. Furthermore, ‘Stoic views’
such as they are tend to come as a package including theology,
metaphysics, logic, ethics and politics. But given that very few people
will accept Stoic views wholesale, it seems that the most interesting
way of using their ideas in contemporary political philosophy is to
examine individual arguments and see how far we can go along with
them.4 So my question to Nussbaum and others is not whether their
interpretation of the Stoics is careful and scholarly enough, but rather
whether their readings of the texts yield the most interesting inter-
pretations. I shall argue that this is not the case, but that there are
different arguments in the Stoic texts, which, taken in isolation from
other arguments, seem to offer a very good basis for a defence of
cosmopolitanism.
3 Nussbaum; ‘Duties of justice’, op. cit. Although I found Nussbaum’s approach
to thinking about how the Stoic texts might contribute to contemporary political
philosophy extremely useful, as will become apparent I disagree with several of her
particular readings, and, more generally, about what the most fruitful Stoic argu-
ments are.
4 In practice this is the course many contemporary interpreters of Stoicism seem to
adopt, for example Nussbaum in the works already cited. This is true not only in
political philosophy but also in other areas, such as the Stoics’ philosophy of mind.
See for example Richard Sorabji, Emotions and Peace of Mind (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000) and Terence Irwin, ‘Stoic Inhumanity’, in eds Sihvola and
Engberg-Pedersen, The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy (Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1998), 219–42.
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In Section Two, I argue that the interpretation of the texts which
Nussbaum, at least, relies on is not terribly useful, as it claims that the
Stoic arguments for cosmopolitanism depend on a theological or
metaphysical world view that we no longer share. A.A. Long, in his
Hellenistic Philosophy,5 proposes that Stoic cosmopolitanism is
grounded in the belief that there is an all-pervading ‘divine breath’
which unites human beings, so that it is our duty to love and respect
its presence everywhere. Nussbaum’s own reading of this cosmology
is Kantian:6 reason is divine, and therefore there is a spark of the
divine in each human being which we must respect. One of the claims
I defend in this paper is that this is not where we should look for the
Stoic argument for cosmopolitanism.
In Section Three, I suggest a very different interpretation of Stoic
cosmopolitanism which starts off from an Aristotelian argument (in
spirit if not historically) but differs from Aristotle’s view in one
crucial respect. The Stoics’ texts show that they seem to believe, like
Aristotle, that human beings flourish as active parts of a whole, that
the end of human life cannot be realised alone, but is essentially a
matter of co-operation with other human beings. On the other hand,
the Stoics do not share Aristotle’s rather unconvincing view that the
proper forum for human flourishing must be the city state, as it exists
‘by nature’, meaning, amongst other things, that it is self-sufficient.
As very few of us would be prepared to accept this aspect of Aris-
totle’s views, the Stoics’ argument, which explicitly rejects it, should
be very welcome indeed. So I go on review the textual evidence for
this Stoic argument, and show why it succeeds in improving on
Aristotle’s.7
In Section Four, I address an objection. It has been claimed
that with Stoic cosmopolitanism comes a kind of sad resignation.8
Paradoxically, becoming conscious that we belong with the entire
universe, that every human being is important for us, seems to go
together with the realisation that we are alone, that personal
5 A.A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics, 2nd edn.
(London: Duckworth, 1986).
6 Nussbaum, ‘Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism’, op. cit.
7 For Aristotle’s argument see the Politics, Book 1, Chapters 1 and 2; and for a
recent discussion of that argument see Robert Mayhew, ‘Aristotle on the Self-Suf-
ficiency of the City’, History of Political Thought, 16 (1995), 488–502.
8 Nussbaum ‘Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism’ and ‘Compassion and Terror’, op.
cit.; cf. William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York: Random
House, 1929), Lecture II.
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love—for family, friends, country—does not matter any more and
that we ought to strive to give it up. If this objection stands, it has
to be damning: for who wants a theory of human flourishing
which says that the good life is necessarily lonely and loveless? My
interpretation of Stoic cosmopolitanism in Section Three gives me
some leverage against this objection. In answering it I differ, once
again, from Nussbaum, but nonetheless come to the same con-
clusion—that Stoic cosmopolitanism is not incompatible with
preserving one’s personal affiliations. This will be sufficient, I
think, to vindicate the Stoic argument.
DIVINE BREATH AND FRIENDSHIP: A WELL-KNOWN
ARGUMENT REVISITED*
Plutarch, in On the Fortune of Alexander writes that
The much admired Republic of Zeno ... is aimed at this main point, that our
household arrangements should not be based on cities or parishes, each one marked
out by its own legal system, but we should regard all men as our fellow citizens and
local residents, and there should be one way of life and order, like that of a herd
grazing together and nurtured by a common law. Zeno wrote this, picturing as it
were, a dream or image of a philosopher’s well regulated society.9
The recurrence of the theme of world citizenship in Stoic writings has
been well documented, especially since Martha Nussbaum’s recent
writings on the topic have encouraged a renewal of interest in the
Stoics’ political claims.10 The Stoics all believed that we owe moral
allegiance to humanity in general, regardless of nationality. This
allegiance, which the Stoics term ‘co-operation’,11 operates at both the
physical and spiritual levels as it includes the prevention of suffering,12
*Quotation from the Stoics are mostly from A.A. Long and D. Sedley, The Hel-
lenistic Philosophers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987). Passages from
Marcus Aurelius, Plutarch and Epictetus not thus cited are my own translations.
9 Long and Sedley, 67A.
10 Nussbaum, For Love of Country, ‘Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism’, Culti-
vating, Humanity, ‘Compassion and Terror’, op. cit. For some relevant Stoic texts see
Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, IV, 23, VI, 42, XII, 36; Seneca, On Leisure 4,1;
Epictetus, Discourses I, 9; Arius Didymus: Long and Sedley 67C. See also Plato,
Laws X, 903b–d.
11 Marcus Aurelius, VI,42.
12 See for example Cicero, On Duties I, 28–29.
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and the moral education of all.13 Some, like Zeno,14 and possibly
Epictetus,15 believed that this should extend to political allegiance, i.e.
that we should aim for a cosmopolitan government; some, like Cic-
ero,16 that we should remain politically loyal to our state, while sup-
porting humanity in every other possible way. Most, like Marcus
Aurelius, seem to waver, regarding national loyalty as a contingent
duty, one which might be swept away by fate and Roman Imperial-
ism.17 This might be true also of Plutarch.18
Very little has been said, however, on why the Stoics believed in
cosmopolitanism, and whether the arguments which supported their
views are arguments we would still be able to accept. Nussbaum, in
her paper linking Kant’s cosmopolitan views back to the Stoics, hints
that the source of cosmopolitanism might be this:
We should recognize humanity wherever it occurs, and give its fundamental ingre-
dients, reason and moral capacity, our first allegiance and respect.19
It is certainly true that the Stoics seem to agree that rationality is
all-pervading (i.e. present not only in human beings, but in the rest
of nature) and that it matters – for the Stoics, as for Kant, reason
and moral law are closely linked.20 A.A.Long attempts to derive an
argument for cosmopolitanism from the Stoics’ belief in all-per-
vading reason: because human beings are linked together by
reason—pneuma, or divine breath—it is senseless for them not to
cooperate.21
Generally, the problem with such arguments is that prima facie
they give no reason why the mere fact that we are all human, or even
all rational, should entail that we should respect each other and work
together towards the same goal. After all, we do not expect that all
cats should live peacefully in a big brotherhood of cats, even though
they all are cats.
13 Marcus Aurelius, VIII 59, VII 22.
14 See footnote 8.
15 Epictetus, Discourses I, 9.
16 Cicero, On Duties, I, 57.
17 For example contrast I, 5, IV, 3 and 4, XII, 36 with VI, 39 and 44 of the
Meditations.
18 Plutarch, On Exile 8, 602b.
19 Nussbaum, ‘Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism’, op. cit., 7. See also Nussbaum,
‘Duties of Justice’, op. cit. 183–5.
20 Marcus Aurelius, Meditations VII, 9; Cicero, Republic, 3.33; Arius Didymus,
67C.
21 Long, op. cit., 163.
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One way in which the Stoics appear to fill this gap in the argument
is by providing a cosmic metaphysics in which reason is both all-
pervading and divine.22 Because reason is especially manifest in hu-
mans, these have special value, and we should all recognise the divine
spark in every other member of the species and treat them as such.
However, appealing to the divine in order to infuse humanity with
value is not necessarily the most convincing contemporary argument
for the claim that we should respect all humanity. If one does not
believe that there is such a thing as the divine, there is no further
possibility of supporting the argument. And if one does, one might
still hope to convince an atheist colleague without converting him or
her first.
Although the Stoics do believe that reason is divine, and that it is
all-pervading, with an especially strong presence in human beings, it
is not convincing that they regard this as an argument for cosmo-
politanism. Nussbaum and Long infer that there must be an argu-
ment linking the Stoics’ beliefs in divine reason and in
cosmopolitanism – but neither quotes a passage in which that argu-
ment is presented. Indeed, I believe a case may be made for the
contrary claim, namely that the Stoics believe the presence of the
divine in human beings gives us reasons to treat people differently:
just as reason is more strongly present in a human being than, say, in
a potato, some human beings partake in the divine more than others,
namely the virtuous. Greek and Roman Stoics seem to concur that
this is sufficient ground for our preferring the friendship of the
virtuous to that of the non-virtuous. Indeed, they claim that the non-
virtuous cannot form friendships at all.23
Premises which lead to the conclusion that only some human
beings are capable of forming an attachment to other human beings –
because themselves worthy of friendship – probably should not be
expected to yield also the conclusion that we should love and respect
all human beings just because they are human. Marcus Aurelius goes
so far as to say that non-virtuous humans should be tolerated, cared
for and also instructed24 – but his seems to be the most charitable
22 On Stoic reason as ‘divine breath’, see Tad Brennan, ‘The Old Stoic Theory of
the Emotions’, in eds Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen, op. cit., 21–70.
23 See Diogenes Laertius, VII 32-3; 122; 124; Marcus Aurelius II,1; III, 4; V, 30.
24 Marcus Aurelius, VIII, 59 and VII, 22. Troels Engberg-Pedersen discusses
Marcus’s attitude towards those he judges to be inferior in ‘Marcus Aurelius on the
Emotions’, in eds Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen, op. cit., 305–38, pp. 330–4.
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view. In any case, he does not appear to believe that the presence of
reason alone makes a person worthy of love. And if observing that a
person, whilst rational, is not sufficiently so (i.e. not virtuous) can
cause us to experience a kind of disdain and aversion for that person,
then the fact that we are all rational cannot suffice to justify the belief
that human beings should respect each other and work together to-
wards the same goal. Yet Marcus fully supports the view, as indeed
the harsher Stoics do, that we must co-operate with all other human
beings, regardless of whether they are virtuous or not. It seems, then,
that this duty to cooperate does not arise from an attachment to each
being in whom reason is observed.25
The Divine Breath argument proposed by Long, and given in a
slightly different form by Nussbaum, is therefore unsatisfactory for
two reasons. First, it fails to convince a modern reader who does not
necessarily buy into the kind of theism which the Stoics believed in –
or indeed into any kind of theism. Second, it does not seem that this
argument actually convinced the Stoics either, as they appeared to
believe that how much reason one possessed made a difference to how
one should be treated. I believe that these are sufficient reasons, if not
for rejecting the divine breath interpretation of Stoic cosmopolitan-
ism outright, then at least for asking whether there might not be
another Stoic argument for this view.
We should, of course, be suspicious of readings which encourage
a pick and choose attitude to Stoic doctrine. There is a sense in
which Stoic philosophy is indivisible – the logic, metaphysics and
ethics are all interdependent. But the interpretation I am putting
forward does not claim that Stoic cosmopolitanism in independent
of the rest of Stoic doctrine. My claim is both weaker and more
complex. First, I am saying that Stoic cosmopolitanism is not di-
rectly dependent on one particular metaphysical claim. Second, I
think the argument which they offer, and which I discuss in the
following section, is strong enough to be self-standing – not that
what the Stoics proposed was in fact self-standing. It is possible for
the same argument to be supported in very different ways, and this
is what I am about to suggest regarding the argument for cosmo-
politanism found in the Stoic texts, i.e. ask whether that argument is
plausible in its own terms, independently of Stoic cosmology. I shall
argue that it is.
25 Marcus Aurelius, VI, 42.
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A SECOND ARGUMENT FOR BELONGING: ARISTOTELIAN
TELEOLOGY WITH A STOIC TWIST
Given that according to the Stoics themselves, noticing that another
person is rational is not enough to inspire the kind of sentiment that
will lead us to respect them, what other argument do they give in
support of cosmopolitanism? When the Stoics discuss human nature,
they do not stop at a description of the role of reason and the
emotions. Like Aristotle, they go further, and posit a concept of the
human good and a theory about how that good is attainable within a
human life:
It is satisfaction to a man to do the proper works of a man. Now it is a proper work
of a man to be benevolent to his own kind, to despise the movements of the senses, to
form a just judgement of plausible appearances, and to take a survey of the nature of
the universe and of the things which happen in it.26
Closer study of the ‘sociableness’ of the universe27 and of human
beings in particular leads Marcus to remark that individual human
beings are to the entire human community as a limb (melos) to a
body, which by its nature contributes to the good of the whole as its
own good, and not just a part (meros) which may either participate in
the activity of the whole or act independently (VII, 13). A person
acting as a mere part would be as hand which has been cut off – dead
and useless (VIII, 34).28
Cicero gives us a slightly different interpretation of the same
metaphor.29 According to him, if we are to the human community as
a limb to a body, then we cannot turn on another member of that
community for our own benefit; but apart from that, it is acceptable
that each should seek their own benefit first. It is not clear whether
the analogy supports that claim, at least not in a strong sense. To be
part of a community as a limb is part of a body means that we should
pay at least as much attention to the good of the whole as to our
personal good, since private good depends on the good of the whole.
It is in the hand’s interest that the heart should survive, so that we
may protect our heart from a projectile with our hand, even though
26 Meditations VIII, 26. See also IV, 44, and compare to Aristotle’s ergon argu-
ment in Nicomachean Ethics 1097b24.
27 Marcus Aurelius V, 30.
28 See also Epictetus, Discourses, II, 10. Again, this rhetoric can also be found in
Aristotle: see Politics Book I 1253a18–28.
29 On Duties III, 22.
10 BERGES
the hand will be hurt. If our hand had any choice in the matter, it
would make sense for it to choose being hurt and protect the heart, as
it could not survive if the heart stopped working. Cicero is, of course,
as Nussbaum showed in her paper, trying to save property rights
from the threat of putative duties to assist those who are in need.30
But his more moderate view allows us to embrace co-operation
without threatening anti-individualistic implications.
The Roman Stoics appear to believe, then, that human nature is
sociable in the strong sense—that in order to flourish, a human being
must be a full member of the human community, i.e. refrain from
harming other human beings, and if possible, contribute to the good
of the human community by working with others.31
Now we are dealing with claims that may be more palatable to the
modern mind than the previous appeal to divine reason was, in
particular because contemporary virtue ethics seem to have revived
and given credibility to certain kinds of teleological argument in
ethics.32 The Stoics appear to be offering some variation on the well-
worn argument that, as we are by nature sociable, and cannot survive
alone, it simply goes against nature (and therefore impedes the
flourishing of the individual who so acts) to fail to co-operate with
others. But the conclusion of the argument is not well-worn – for the
Stoics do not settle for any political arrangement that organises a
given number of people in the fairest possible way. For the Stoics,
human sociability can be fulfilled only in a community which
encompasses the whole of human society.
Its conclusion, a part of, the structure of this argument, it has to be
noted, is similar to Aristotle’s in Book I of the Politics. Aristotle
wants to show that the state exists by nature. Individuals, he says, can
flourish only within a state, as no other form of association is self-
sufficient; the state thus allows human beings to function in the way
that is proper for them, i.e. physically, socially and politically. More
importantly, life in the state allows one to develop virtues which are
proper to humanity, through engagement in political deliberation.33
30 Nussbaum, ‘Duties of Justice’, op. cit.
31 Marcus Aurelius VI, 39, 42, VIII, 59; Cicero On Duties I, 22.
32 See for example R. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1999); Michael Slote, Morals from Motives (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2001): although Slote’s virtue ethics is more Platonic than Aristotelian, they still
embrace some kind of teleology.
33 Politics Book I, 1253a18–29.
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To the modern reader, Aristotle’s notion that the state is self-
sufficient is puzzling – even though modern states are spread over
much larger territories than the ancient city states were. No state
today is self-sufficient either in terms of physical resources, or of
social and political needs. And it is hard to believe that even Greek
city-states were ever self-sufficient. Athens certainly was not, as its
survival was linked to that of its empire. There are of course more
charitable and subtle readings of Aristotle’s self-sufficiency clause,
which I shall turn to later in this section. First, however, I shall show
that what the Stoics, Greek and Roman, have to offer is a version of
Aristotle’s view that man is a political animal which needs to be part
of a political community, not only in order to survive, but also in
order to flourish, without incorporating the implausible claim that
the city is self-sufficient and therefore natural.
In fact, the Stoics offer both a refutation of the Aristotelian claim
that the state is natural and an argument for the view that the entire
community of human beings is the proper community for full human
functioning. The latter is again an appeal to divine reason, and as
such not terribly convincing. However, if the Stoics embrace Aris-
totle’s view that human beings can flourish only by co-operating with
other human beings, and if, moreover, they believe that the city-state
is no more ‘natural’ than the family or village as a human association,
then it follows that in order to flourish, human beings must live as co-
citizens with all other human beings. The further argument is thus
unnecessary.
The clearest statement of the argument against the view that the
city state is natural – and at the same time of the argument that the
cosmos is the only real city and therefore the proper focus of our
moral and political obligation—is probably this passage from
Epictetus:
Never in reply to the question, to what country you belong, say that you are an
Athenian or a Corinthian, but that you are a citizen of the world. For why do you
say that you are an Athenian, and why do you not say that you belong to the small
nook only into which your poor body was cast at birth? Is it not plain that you call
yourself an Athenian or Corinthian from the place which has a greater authority
and comprises not only that small nook itself and all your family, but even the
whole country from which the stock of your progenitors is derived down to you?
He then who has observed with intelligence the administration of the world, and
has learned that the greatest and supreme and the most comprehensive community
is that which is composed of men and God, and that from God have descended the
seeds not only to my father and grandfather, but to all beings which are generated
on the earth and are produced, and particularly to rational beings – for these only
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are by their nature formed to have communion with God, being by means of
reason conjoined with Him – why should not such a man call himself a citizen of
the world, why not a son of God, and why should he be afraid of anything which
happens among men?34
If to belong to a particular place, and therefore community, is to
have been born there, Epictetus says, then we might as well say we
are from the exact spot where we were born. If, on the other hand,
the purpose of claiming allegiance with one particular part of the
world is to assert the links between oneself and one’s ancestry,
then claiming to belong to a state is probably not adequate. There
must be very few people, then as today, who can claim an ancestry
which is exclusively situated in their own birth country; at the very
least, they will have to plead ignorance at times. One’s place of
belonging would thus be either a bed in a specific part of a town,
or a geographical area defined by the places of birth of one’s
ancestors. Either way, it probably won’t make sense for anyone to
claim that they are ‘Athenian’, ‘French’ or ‘American’. This arbi-
trariness of national belonging is reflected by Plutarch in On
Exile:35
By Nature, as Aristo said, there is no native land just as there is no house or
cultivated field, smithy, or doctor’s surgery; each one of these comes to be so, or
rather, is so named and called, always in relation to the occupant and user. 36
So to define oneself as belonging to a particular city, state or country
is not to say anything deep enough about oneself to infer who or what
we owe allegiance to. In other words, the Stoics say, there are no
grounds for being patriotic at the expense of the welfare of people
who happen to live elsewhere. It remains that if there is a community
of human beings, and that if belonging to it in the strong sense (i.e.
being a member or limb rather than a part) is crucial to flourishing,
then that community cannot be anything smaller than the entire
world. In other words the argument is that our allegiance cannot be
geographically grounded: so no geographically identified community
can replace the Aristotelian city—other than the entire world, which
34 Discourses, I, 9.
35 See also Seneca, who refers to our nation states as ‘The other, the one to which
we have been assigned by the accident of our birth’: On Leisure, Book IV, Chapter 1.
36 On Exile 600e.
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has no geographical boundaries—in order for flourishing to take
place.37 We do not need Epictetus’s further appeal to god and reason
in order to draw that conclusion: the refutation of Aristotle’s claim
that city-states are the natural forum for human flourishing, together
with the acceptance of his claim that human beings are essentially
social and political, is enough.38
Granted that the Stoics can offer an Aristotelian view that is also
cosmopolitan, one might still be unhappy with the rejection of
Aristotle’s city-centered view, on the grounds that it was based on an
uncharitable, unsubtle reading of the self-sufficiency claim. To make
the Stoics’ view convincing, we must show that it is preferable even to
a more subtle reading of Aristotle. In order to understand what
Aristotle means by his claim that the city is self-sufficient—unlike the
family unit, or the village structure—we must turn back to his con-
ception of flourishing, and ask what it is about the city which enables
flourishing better than the family or the village; and then, whether it
does this better or worse than a cosmopolitan political organisation
would. Only then we will have a fairer appreciation of the conflict
between Aristotle and Stoic Cosmopolitanism.39
The kind of political participation envisaged by Aristotle is direct:
it involves debating and decision-making, and taking it in turns to
implement these decisions. The effect is threefold. First, one is
encouraged to engage in philosophical dialogue on moral and polit-
ical issues; second, we have a say in how we will be governed, and
37 We could also say that if allegiance cannot be geographically grounded, then we
owe allegiance to nowhere in particular. The group of people to whom we owe
allegiance would then have to be picked according to criteria other than geographical
– such as belonging to the same family, religion or political association. But it seems
that if we start off by accepting, with the Stoics, that in order to flourish we must
regard ourselves as a member of humankind in general, and if we remove geo-
graphical barriers, we would not be justified in then positing different barriers. We
would have to conclude that we owe allegiance to the world at large. Thanks to an
anonymous referee for pointing out this problem.
38 Arius Didymus presents an argument similar to the second part of the one in the
Epictetus passage quoted above, where he appeals to the idea that gods rule over the
world and that therefore the world as a whole is like a city—Long and Sedley, op.
cit., 67.
39 Here I am taking certain liberties with the Stoics, as they mostly saw cosmo-
politanism as a matter of moral, rather than political, allegiance. However, these
days it seems that international moral matters are more efficiently dealt with by
international political organisations, even if some of those are not affiliated to any
government.
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more than that, actually govern ourselves; and third, we are forced to
come to a realisation that we belong to a community, and that to
sustain ourselves we must sustain the community.
In some sense it is clear that the city-state is especially well-suited
for this kind of involvement. If there is but a small number of citizens
(excluding, as Aristotle did, women, slaves, foreigners and people
who need to work) it is easy for them to meet and discuss in depth
and at leisure the problems at hand. In a larger, cosmopolitan,
political arena it is not the case that complete dialogue can be
established: no citizen will know what every over citizen has to say
and be able to respond to it. Decision-making and self-government is
also affected. In a world-sized state an individual vote would weigh
almost nothing, so there would be no sense, even in a democracy, of
being in charge of our destinies. On the other hand, belonging to a
human community is what Stoic cosmopolitanism is about: to tran-
scend one’s national affiliation is necessary for realising that one
belongs to a human community qua being human, as opposed to a
French community qua speaking French or living in France. Patri-
otism or nationalism of a certain kind prevent this full realisation
from taking place. Nussbaum writes that we sometimes fail to realise
that people in other countries are fully human;40 we can go further:
until we realise that they are like us and belong with us, we fail to
realise that we are fully human.
On the third point, the full realisation of our nature as belonging
to a community, a cosmopolitan society is clearly better suited for
human flourishing than the city-state. The city-state seems prima
facie better suited than the cosmopolitan society on the first and
second point; but on closer inspection it turns out that this is not
the case. We at first said that political dialogue was more likely to
take place in the smaller environment of the city-state. However,
this is to ignore the technological developments which have enabled
people all over the world to communicate cheaply and efficiently
about anything they want. Many leading newspapers set up internet
discussion groups on news topics, as well as opinion polls, and there
are many independent discussion groups. Moreover, many of the
political issues that affect citizens of any country are international
issues, and not to treat them as such is to address them superficially,
and with potentially dire consequences. Issues that come
40 Nussbaum, ‘Compassion and Terror’, op. cit.
15LONELINESS AND BELONGING
immediately to mind are environmental issues and those of post-
colonial politics.41
The issue of self-government may at first seem more vexed, as the
individual would tend to be lost in an international political context.
However, what seems to count in Aristotle is that one should take an
active part in decision-making. Imagine a committee in which the
votes are unequally weighed. One member’s vote counts for five, but
she does not take part in any discussion of the issue that was being
voted on. Another member’s vote counts for one, but she actively
discusses the issue and tries to persuade others to adopt her point of
view. It is arguable that this apparently less powerful member is
nonetheless more in charge of her own destiny than the one whose
vote counts for more. In a world where votes were equally balanced
and each person took part in some discussion group regarding the
political issues that they had to vote on, it is arguable that, no matter
how many citizens there were, they would be engaged in self-
government.
In fact, then, a cosmopolitan city is not less suited to human
flourishing than an Aristotelian city-state would be; and even on a
more charitable reading of Aristotle’s self-sufficiency claim, the Stoic
view comes out as the more plausible. However, there remains an
objection to be considered, and one which may make us feel that,
although plausible, we should not be keen to embrace the Stoic view.
I consider this objection in the following two sections.
STOIC RESIGNATION AND LONELINESS: AN OBJECTION
Nussbaum makes the following comment on Stoic cosmopolitanism:
For getting to the point where we can give such concern evenhandedly to all
human beings requires, as Marcus makes abundantly clear, the systematic extir-
pation of intense cares and attachments directed at the local: one’s family, one’s
city, the objects of one’s love and desire. ... all this leads us into a strange world, a
world that is gentle and unaggressive, but also strangely lonely and hollow. To
unlearn the habits of the sports fan we must unlearn our erotic investment in the
41 See Nussbaum, ‘Aristotelian Social Democracy’ in B.Douglall, G.R. Mara and
H.S. Richardson, Liberalism and the Good (London: Routledge, 1990), 203–52,
pp. 207–8.
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world, our attachments to our own team, our own love, our own children, our own
life.42
Let me respond to this point in two ways. First, if Nussbaum is right,
then she has unearthed what seems to me a strong objection to Stoic
cosmopolitanism. If, as I have argued in the previous section, Stoic
cosmopolitanism is based on a view of the human good, and at the
same time being cosmopolitan makes one unable to love those close
to one, or even the country one lives in, better than we love
others—in other words, if it makes one miserable—then the claim
that the way to flourish is to become cosmopolitan is, to say the least,
implausible.43 In the next section, I examine some possible replies to
this objection. Second, it is not clear that what Nussbaum says about
Marcus is enough to conclude that cosmopolitanism necessarily leads
to loneliness, and to the systematic abandonment of particular
affections.
It is undeniable that Marcus Aurelius is not a cheerful, upbeat
writer. However, it might be a little hasty to trace his depressive
tendencies to his cosmopolitan attitudes. First, Marcus was an em-
peror, and Roman emperors could not, for all sorts of reasons, be
anything but lonely. Secondly, there is another strand to Stoic
thought, very much present in the Meditations, which would almost
certainly lead one to experience loneliness and lack of warm,
enthusiastic feelings: fatalism.
42 Nussbaum, ‘Compassion and Terror’, op. cit.; see also Nussbaum, ‘Kant and
Stoic Cosmopolitanism’, op cit., 11: ‘In the writings of Marcus, especially, one
sometimes feels a boundless loneliness, as if the removal of props of habit and local
boundaries had left life bereft of a certain warmth and security. If one begins life as a
child who loves and trusts its parents, it is tempting to want to reconstruct citizenship
along the same lines, finding in an idealised image of a group or nation a surrogate
parent who will do one’s thinking for one. Cosmopolitanism, by contrast, requires a
nation of adults, who do not need a childlike dependence upon omnipotent parental
figures.’
43 There are some parallels between this objection and the communitarian criti-
cism of Kantian Liberalism, i.e. that it is based on a conception of the self as purely
rational and does not recognise the importance of family or community relationships
in making moral decisions. MacIntyre’s 1984 paper, ‘Is Patriotism a Virtue?’,
reprinted in ed. Ronald Beiner, Theorizing Citizenship (New York: State University
of New York Press, 1995), 209–28, is particularly relevant here. But see also Michael
Sandel’s Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992); and Amy Gutman’s review article, ‘Communitarian Critics of Liber-
alism’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 14, (1985), 308–22.
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Stoic fatalism is the belief that our lives are pre-determined,
without the belief that whoever does the determining is a loving
father-figure who has our best interests at heart and will see us
through in the end: what results is a ‘frosty chill’.44 Does this view,
however, generate also loneliness? It might do, if one took the view
that as one’s close friends or relatives may be destined to die soon, or
to suffer, it is best not to care too much about them. This seems to be
the spirit of some advice Epictetus gives to a traveller who will not go
home as he cannot bear to see his sick daughter suffering.45
Equally, one might blame the Stoic philosophy of the emotions for
Marcus’s apparent loneliness – a good Stoic should work on the
systematic extirpation of feelings, positive or negative, as they are in
fact nothing but false beliefs generated by a false conception of the
good.46 However central to Stoic philosophy in general, and in par-
ticular to what the Stoics have to say about cosmopolitanism, it is
nonetheless the case that there is a Stoic argument for cosmopoli-
tanism which is independent of the Stoic theory of the emotions. This
is the argument we examined in the previous section. In other words,
if exerting too much control on his emotions made Marcus lonely, it
does not clearly follow that somebody trying to live up to the Stoic
cosmopolitan ideal must also be lonely.
44 William James makes this point by comparing Stoic fatalism with Judeo-
Christian beliefs :
When Marcus Aurelius reflects on the eternal reason that has ordered things, there is
a frosty chill about his words which you rarely find in a Jewish, and never in a
Christian piece of religious writing. The universe is ‘accepted’ by all these writers; but
how devoid of passion or exultation the spirit of the Roman Emperor is. Compare
his fine sentence ‘If gods care not for me or my children, here is a reason for it,’ with
Job’s cry: ‘Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him?’ and you immediately see the
difference I mean. The anima mundi, to whose disposal of his own personal destiny
the Stoic consents, is there to be respected and submitted to, but the Christian God is
there to be loved and the difference of emotional atmosphere is like that between an
arctic climate and the tropics, though the outcome in the way of accepting actual
conditions uncomplainingly may seem in abstract terms to be much the same: The
varieties of Religious Experience, op. cit., 42.
45 Epictetus Discourses I, 11.
46 This is the standard picture of the Stoics’ views on the emotions, but it is in fact
a controversial view which is being challenged in recent work on Stoic emotions. See
for example Tad Brennan, ‘The Old Stoic Theory of the Emotions’, Terence Irwin,
‘Stoic Inhumanity’ and Troels Engberg-Pedersen, ‘Marcus Aurelius on the Emo-
tions’, all in eds Sihvola and Endberg-Pedersen, op. cit.
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In fact, despite the cosmopolitan demand for impartiality,
fatalism, and their views of the emotions, Stoics seem divided on
love for one’s family, friends and country. The following snippets
provide an impression of the diversity of their views. Whilst
Marcus Aurelius holds impartiality to be one of his most impor-
tant moral tenets,47 he also believes that one should love one’s
children with ‘true affection’.48 Diogenes reports the Stoics as
saying both that ‘honouring one’s parents, brothers and country’ is
kathekonta and that not to do so is contrary to duty,49 and that
the wise should have wives in common, so that they treat all
children alike. In other words, family values matter as things are;
but in an ideal world they would be modified beyond recogni-
tion.50 This sharing of wives and children is also suggested in a
passage from Hierocles, in which he recommends that we should
love our aunts as if they were our mothers, etc., until we have
equal impartial affection for all.51 Seneca argues that filial devotion
is owed in return for parental favours to offspring, favours that we
must struggle to outdo;52 it is therefore fitting, according to him,
to love one’s parents.53 Cicero seems to agree.54 On the other
hand, if Seneca and Cicero feel that they have to provide argu-
ments as to why it is right to love one’s family, then this may well
be because there are some difficulties in reconciling at belief with
Stoic dogma. In the next section. I consider two possible replies to
the objection that Stoic cosmopolitanism is incompatible with the
need to love one’s family more than strangers.
47 Meditations I, 5.
48 Meditations I, 13.
49 Diogenes Laertius, VII 108–109.
50 VII 131.
51 Long and Sedley 56G.
52 The Stoics seem to diverge as to whether what is relevant is that we should feel
affection for certain people, or that we should recognise the special status some
people have and honour them accordingly. Diogenes and Seneca tend to favour
honouring, while Marcus and Hierocles, with whom I am mostly concerned in this
section and the following, take seriously the idea that we have a duty to feel affection
for others, and not merely to respect them.
53 On Favours III, 35, 36.
54 On Duties III, 112.
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PRESERVING LOVE: TWO RESPONSES TO THE OBJECTION
In this section I look at two answers to the objection discussed in the
previous section; one which works, and one which does not. I
start by describing Martha Nussbaum’s solution, and argue that it is
not a good one. Nussbaum suggests that the Stoics do in fact
attempt to resolve the apparent conflict between cosmopolitan
impartiality and local affiliations by claiming that we are in the
middle of concentric circles, each circle encompassing a group of
citizens whom we originally perceive as more distant from us. The
good Stoic will aim to draw people who are in more distant circles
into closer ones until everybody is in the inner circle.55 The image of
the concentric circle comes from a fragment by Hierocles.56 However,
it is not clear that the passage can be used to argue for the conclusion
that it is possible to be cosmopolitan and love one’s family, friends
and country. It gives specific instructions on how to carry out the
process of oikeiosis,57 central to the Stoic conception of moral
development. Oikeiosis is the extension of natural tendencies to self-
preservation to an impartial concern for all.58 This is the right way to
develop for a being who is both concerned to protect its own interests
and rational; for such a being will see that, rationally, their interests
cannot be more important than anybody else’s. On this picture, love
of one’s family is natural, and one stage of oikeiosis that human
beings must go through: but it is not the last stage. To care exces-
sively for one’s family, or to care for them at the expense of concern
for outsiders, is for the Stoics a mark of immaturity.59
In order to extend our concern beyond ourselves and those close to
us, Hierocles says, we must try to draw the people in the outer circles
in to the inner ones; and this can be achieved by changing the names
we give them. So for instance, we should call our aunt ‘mother’ and
55 See Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity, op. cit., 60.
56 Long and Sedley, 56G.
57 For a discussion of the concept of oikeiosis and its uses in Stoic philosophy, see
Gisela Striker, ‘The Role of Oikeiosis in Stoic Ethics’, Oxford Studies in Ancient
Philosophy, I (1983), 145–167; Christopher Gill, ‘Did Galen Understand Platonic
and Stoic Thinking on Emotions?, in eds Julia Sihvola and Troes Engberg-Perdersen,
op. cit., 113–48; Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1993).
58 See Annas, op. cit., 265.
59 See L. Hill, op. cit., 67. But see also Diogenes’ puzzling comment that family
love is natural only for the virtuous (VII, 120).
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our cousin ‘brother’. As Annas points out, the objections Aristotle
brought against Plato’s communal living proposal in the Republic
apply here as well:
If you try to spread family feeling more widely, you don’t produce a larger family,
you just water down the sentiment. Calling your aunt ‘mother’ will then just devalue
what to attach to calling someone your mother. However, even if it worked, this
might help Plato but not the Stoics. For we would still have a version of family
feeling. Thinking of my aunts as my mothers brings them closer to me; it does not
tend to make me impartial where considering their interest is at stake – rather the
opposite.60
Annas offers a twofold criticism of this model. On one scenario the
concentric circles model will not work, as it is not possible to ‘spread’
the affection one feels for one’s family without its getting thinner.
This is reminiscent of Nussbaum’s point referred to in the previous
section, that in order to care for all, one must disinvest oneself of
one’s real affections. Alternatively, the model does work: but then,
instead of producing impartiality, it implies that as one reduces the
distance between the outer and inner circles, so one becomes partial
in relation to a larger number of people, rather than impartial. Those
who have not yet made it to the inner circles are thus faced with my
partiality about a growing number of people.
The latter point may seem inoffensive: isn’t it better to be partial
about a large number of people – with the hope that one will even-
tually be partial about all—than to be partial only towards one’s
family? In order to see why it is not inoffensive, consider the
following. You are applying for a job in country X. You know that
the citizens of X are striving to become cosmopolitan and that they
have followed Hierocles’ advice. They have managed to create
personal links with citizens from many countries, but not yours. So
when it comes to the selection process we know that most people will
be preferred to you just because they belong to the appointers’ inner
circles – you don’t stand a chance.
So to increase the number of people one counts as family is not a
step towards impartiality; quite the contrary. But how about the
suggestion that instead of reproducing our affection for those close to
us and giving it to strangers, we should, after all, ‘water down’ our
feelings and redistribute them equally? Is it as offensive as Aristotle
and Annas seem to think? Is it not better in many ways to feel a true
but non-violent affection for everyone than to have strong feelings for
60 Annas, op. cit., 268.
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a few and none for the rest? Compare for instance the parents of a
much-wanted single child with those of a large brood. The intensity
of the love, the violence of the feelings, the constancy of their
expression may be different: but in both cases the love is genuine.
Indeed, when Marcus enjoins us to love our children with true
affection61 he must believe that distributing our love to humankind
does not leave us with something unworthy of that name. Loving
more people is not necessarily incompatible with loving them well.
We might thus want to concede this point to Hierocles, namely
that it is possible to love more people with a genuine affection in a less
intense and maybe a more relaxed and reasonable manner. However,
we cannot concede that spreading our love in the way he describes,
attempting to love those who are far in the way we love those who are
close, is not a way of developing impartiality whilst preserving some
aspects of partiality. It is just a way of becoming partial towards more
people. Hierocles cannot entirely succeed, then, in providing us with
an answer to the original worry: namely, does Stoic cosmopolitanism
allow us to prefer our own in any way, or does it condemn us to
impartiality in every aspect of our lives, and hence to unbearable
loneliness?
I propose we look at a different argument which aims to reconcile
cosmopolitanism with personal affections, one which comes from the
originator of the objection that cosmopolitanism leads to loneliness:
Marcus Aurelius. I draw the argument from two sections of the
Meditations in particular, although no doubt it could be supported by
other passages. The first passage is this:
How hast thou behaved hitherto to the gods, thy parents, brethren, children,
teachers, to those who looked after thy infancy, to thy friends, kinsfolk, to thy
slaves? Consider if thou hast hitherto behaved to all in such a way that this may be
said of thee: Never has he wronged a man in deed or word.62
In this passage, Marcus is linking the universal requirement that one
should harm no one to the particular relationships we have. If it is
true that we should harm no one, then it is true that we should not
harm our parents, friends or city. But from an impartial perspective,
is this question relevant? Should we not ask instead whether we have
harmed people we don’t know, or don’t care for? That a person is
treating their family well is hardly a test of their impartiality and
61 Meditations I, 13.
62 Meditations V, 31.
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general goodwill towards humankind. After all, if we treat our family
well, it is unlikely to be from a universal duty to respect all human
beings: more probably it will be the result of filial affection. So what
does Marcus mean in this passage?
One possible reading of the passage is this. We should never treat
others badly. We have close relationships with family, friends and
some others, which we cannot sever without treating them badly (or,
these people have done us favours which we have to return in order
not to treat them badly, as Seneca might say). Therefore we should
take special care not to treat family and friends badly. Human society
is such, the argument goes, that we are more likely to hurt those we
are close to just because we have special, demanding, relationships
with them. As these relationships are crucial to the good functioning
of society, it is important to preserve them. This idea is, I believe,
expressed in this second passage from the Meditations:
Adapt thyself to the things with which thy lot has been cast: and the men among
whom thou hast received thy portion, love them, but do it truly, sincerely.63
This same argument is present in Plutarch, On Exile, when he draws a
distinction between abandoning one’s country voluntarily and doing
it out of necessity:
Indeed, if you consider reality outside of all false opinion, a man who has but one
city is to the others nothing but a guest and a foreigner. Of course, it is neither right
nor honest to abandon one’s own city in order to go and inhabit another.’ Tis Sparta
that has fallen to your lot: honour it, be it a gloriless, sick city, troubled by political
ills and intestinal struggles. But when fortune has torn a man away from his city, she
permits him to adopt whichever one he pleases.64
The same argument for impartiality that leads the Stoics to prefer
cosmopolitanism to patriotism does, nonetheless, push for a certain
kind of patriotism. Given that some people depend on our allegiance
more than others, and would be hurt if we were to withdraw it, we
have reason to offer those people some allegiance—although not so
much that we shall hurt other people, or be deaf to their claims on
our help. So when there are people whose proximity means that they
will make claims on us, then it is right that we should pay attention to
them.
The claim that children are better off being cared for by those who
are close to them – members of their family, teachers, neighbours and
63 Meditations VI, 39; see also Cicero, On Duties, I, 50.
64 Plutarch, On Exile 8.602b.
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friends – need not be based on considerations of expediency. If it
were, it would be open to the objection that it is in fact more expe-
dient, and does more good overall, to devote one’s resources to
feeding and educating children in developing countries than it is to
see to the education and upbringing of one’s own child. Rather, the
Stoics’ view is that the right development of a human being depends
on their having personal affiliations. The Stoic concept of oikeiosis,65
which could be translated as ‘making one’s home in the universe’,
implies that human development is based on the gradual appropri-
ation of what is properly human. The child begins by recognising her
body as hers, then her family members and her community; and,
eventually, she comes to realise her full membership of the human
community – she becomes a cosmopolites. So in order for human
beings to become cosmopolitan, they must go through the various
stages of oikeiosis, and there have to be structures of affiliation for
this to be possible: family, friends, community. This can easily be
translated into more neutral terms. Moral development, we might
say, depends on the child’s being able to form deep attachments, and
to feel that she is a valued part of a family or small community; and
this is fairly uncontroversial, I think.66
Although the Stoics believe that we have a moral duty to care for
those who are close to us, they do not, on the whole, say that it is
necessary that there should be cities: patriotism, then, is not indis-
pensable. If the Stoic cosmopolitan ideal were to be fulfilled to its
limit, then we would not have cities to be loyal to. There would still
be geographical, cultural or other loyalties that go beyond family
loyalties, but these would not be threatening to the common good in
the way that full-blown patriotism sometimes is. For example, a Stoic
cosmopolitan will not be so engrossed in global matters that she will
not care that the forest area in her town is under threat. She will feel
that she owes her town that much loyalty, that it has fallen to her lot,
and that she must, because she is ideally placed for that purpose, help
look after it.
65 See footnote 54.
66 This is in no way an argument for a particular kind of family structure. Even a
Kibbutz model of the upbringing of children would satisfy the requirements I have
laid out: all that is needed is that children should be brought up in an environment
that they can claim as theirs, by people they can form deep attachments to, but who
need not actually be related to them.
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It would be wrong to conclude that the Stoics simply recom-
mended that we all love our parents, children, lovers, friends and our
countries as we are naturally bound to, and that the rest will take care
of itself. While they did believe that human fellowship depended on
there being such close relationships, these relationships are not by any
means the ones we are naturally bound to have. Examples of such
unnatural feelings abound in Seneca’s writings on family love, in
particular in On Anger 12,1 and 2. We should be moved to fight to
save or avenge our parents, not by feeling, he says, but by duty. It is
inappropriate, according to him, to feel anger at the sight of one’s
mother being raped; or to feel faint when one’s father is being
operated on (presumably without being put to sleep first); or again, to
be pained when he is killed. Marcus may claim that we should love
our family and friends truly, but he does not specify what that means.
No doubt Seneca holds true love to be based on reason rather than in
the emotions, and as a Stoic, Marcus may well share this belief.
The Stoic theory of moral development does not allow real,
emotional relationships with the people we are close to, so it may well
lead to loneliness. On the other hand, it does not seem that the
argument for cosmopolitanism I have presented here depends greatly
on the principle of oikeiosis, or the idea that it is somehow immature
to be emotionally involved. The argument merely points out that we
have no reason, emotional or otherwise, to give our allegiance to any
particular country, but to give it instead to the world as a whole. We
do not need to embrace any other Stoic view in order to support it.
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